We propose a game theoretical model to assess the capacity of Catalonia to become a recognized, independent country with at least a de facto European Union (EU) membership. Support for Catalan independence is increasing for reasons pertaining to identity and economics. Spain can avoid a vote for independence by effectively 'buying-out' a proportion of the Catalan electorate with a funding agreement favorable to Catalonia. If, given the current economic circumstances, the buying-out strategy is too expensive, a proindependence vote is likely to pass. Our model predicts an agreement in which Spain and the European Union accommodate Catalan independence in exchange for Catalonia taking a share of the Spanish debt. If Spain and the EU do not accommodate, Spain becomes insolvent, which in turn destabilizes the EU. The current economic woes of Spain and the EU both contribute to the desire for Catalan independence and make it possible.
Introduction
Economically advanced democracies make very stable states and so far no secessionist movement has been successful in peacefully breaking away from one of them. i This fact stands in sharp contrast with Alesina and Spoloare's theory of state size which holds that states should proliferate in a highly globalized international environment where conquest is rare.
ii This should be particularly true within the European Union (EU), which provides security and economies of scale to its members and thus creates the conditions in which minority nations have the right incentives to seek independence. Although strong secessionist movements exist in the EU (e.g. Scotland, Flanders, the Basque Country), none of them have gained sufficient popular support nor had the leverage to obtain recognition from their sovereign. That may not be the case anymore for Catalonia. We argue that he recent increase in support for independence in Catalonia is based on the dire economic circumstances affecting Spain, so keeping the status quo is no longer attractive for the Catalan government and a large proportion of the Catalan population. iii We predict that if a pro-independence referendum passes, Catalonia will secede from Spain and become, at least, a de-facto member of the EU. iv The main deterrent used by the Spanish government is the claim that an independent Catalonia would not be internationally recognized and therefore excluded from the EU. We demonstrate that this is a non-credible threat.
There is an expression in Spanish that the choice between two unpleasant options is like being stuck between the sword and the wall. v Spain could potentially face such a choice over Catalan secession. Using a game theoretical model, we assess the policy options for both the Spanish central government (Spain) and the Catalan regional government (Catalonia).
Spain can stop a referendum by proposing a funding agreement that is sufficiently favorable to Catalonia and thus reduce the reasons to call an independence referendum with an uncertain outcome. Such an offer may not be an option in the current economic climate and therefore a referendum is most likely to be called. If it passes, Catalonia will need to decide on whether to seek a settlement without independence, or take the path to full sovereignty.
The unequivocal decision to become independent forces a choice upon Spain and the EU: (1)
To accommodate Catalan independence and accession to the EU if Catalonia accepts a percentage of the Spanish national debt; (2) To deny formal recognition to Catalonia but risk Spanish insolvency and the economic viability of the Euro. vi Assuming that Catalonia can move toward independence in a peaceful manner that Madrid cannot ignore, and assuming that the Spanish state does not (or simply cannot) choose to stop the independence movement through violence, we show that accommodation becomes the optimal solution for all parties.
The use of violence is a poor option for Spain. The very essence of the EU is to avoid conflict in Europe. In Robert Schuman's words, the process of European unification started to 'make war not only unthinkable but materially impossible.' This line of thinking was formalized in the 1950 Schuman Declaration, the agreement that created the first incarnation of the EU, the European Coal and Steel Community. Indeed, the use of military force within the EU would be hard to justify ethically, and it would further destabilize an already unstable economic environment. The export-intensive Catalan economy is heavily integrated into a pan-European supply chain. vii Even a low level intervention -e.g. the dismissal and arrest of the Catalan government viii -would disrupt that supply chain and generate huge losses in the short term. More importantly, such a move would threaten stability and cause an increase in the debt risk premiums of Spain and, possibly, other economically imperiled European countries. The only way Spain and the EU can pacify the markets in the event of Catalonia seeking independence following a successful referendum would be to reach a viable long term solution as soon as possible.
The remainder of this paper will proceed as follows. We first discuss the dynamics of secessionism in advanced democracies. We then provide background on the Catalan case, describing the political and economic landscape. We next develop a 2-player game where the resulting solution is negotiated independence, and we discuss the assumptions on which it is based. We finish with conclusions and implications.
Secessionism in Advanced Democracies
There are a number of reasons for why a group of individuals within a country would attempt to form an independent state. The most common explanation points to nationalism, which according to Gellner, is the belief that the 'political and the national unit should be Although some theorists argue that regions should be allowed to exit the state following a proper plebiscite, the time when the international community is prepared to accommodate such a principle has not yet come. Practices of recognition could of course change, especially if a nation is able to secede under these terms and set a precedent -an issue we return to in the conclusion. But until then, the best route to independence for regions like Catalonia is to win the consent of their sovereign. Doing so requires persuasion, legitimate behavior, and, as we argue, careful bargaining.
Catalonia and Secessionism
Catalonia has a distinctive language spoken by the majority of the population and a ). These data are listed in Table 1 . If we recalculate these percentages after removing the abstentions, independence would pass by at least 65% of the vote. In Table 2 we present the lower bound support for independence estimation in a hypothetical referendum. Note that we have been conservative by pooling the 'Other' option from We argue that the reasons for this increase in the independence vote are both political and economic. In the next sections we discuss the political and economic landscape of Catalonia and explain why these factors have catalyzed Catalan public opinion.
The Catalan political landscape
The Catalan political environment has traditionally been understood along two axes:
the ideological dimension (left-right placement) and the identity dimension (more or less prone to independence). Today the 135 seats of the Catalan Parliament are occupied by seven different political parties (two of them are coalitions). The first five columns of Table 3 summarize their placement along the two dimensions mentioned.
The Catalan political landscape is more diverse ideologically than in terms of identity.
There are four political parties that could be classified as left or left leaning to different degrees (PSC, ERC, ICV and CUP), and there is one party clearly on the right (PP).
Meanwhile, the CiU coalition is center-right, though the two constituent parties possess identity differences. Finally, although originally Ciutadans (C's) shared many similarities with the PSC, today is a centrist party that has also been quite successful in obtaining conservative (PP) votes. Overall, the Catalan Parliament is fairly divided; there are 69 seats on the right, 57 seats on the left, and nine unassigned seats belonging to the C's. The political landscape is more complicated once we include the identity dimension.
In the political discourse there are two key questions: (1) Should a referendum on In sum, Catalan secessionism has gained momentum in recent years partly on account of economic and political problems. We argue that the current economic crisis also presents Catalonia with an opportunity.
A Path to Independence
In the previous sections we discussed the key factors in the current push for Catalan independence. First, there is increasing support in the polls for an independent state, making a referendum likely but uncertain to pass. Second, this increasing support is based on economic factors, so Spain can attempt to stop the independence process by offering a better funding model to Catalonia. If Spain does (or cannot) make such an offer, a referendum is likely to occur. In that event, strong support for independence would put Spain in a difficult position between the sword and the wall.
We model the strategic interaction of Spain and Catalonia using a simple sequential game (see Figure 2 ). 
Spain (and the EU)
Seek Independence In summary, our model predicts either an offer from Spain that is high enough to stop a Catalan referendum for independence or, if such an offer is not affordable, a referendum that, once passing, would lead to independence accommodated by Spain and the EU. Unaccommodated independence entails a non-credible threat and therefore is not on the equilibrium path.
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Peaceful Coercion and Non-Violence
Special attention needs to be paid to the meaning of the strategy Seek Independence.
This choice needs to be both credible and something that Spain cannot ignore. We argue that
here Catalonia needs to do more than simply demand that Spain recognizes them -a demand that Spain may simply ignore if the results are deemed costless. Instead, the Catalan leadership needs to proceed with a strategy of peaceful coercion, which includes several elements. First, Catalonia will need to make a formal declaration of independence in the eyes of the world. xli Second, it should make a public statement that the transition to sovereignty will be conducted in a peaceful manner. Overall, Catalonia needs to coerce a response out of Spain and the EU. We maintain that clear and public statements regarding sovereignty and the schedule for establishing it are moves that cannot be ignored. The current economic environment in Spain and the EU are a central component of our argument, one that provides Catalonia with considerable leverage.
If it proceeds toward independence in the right manner, and the use of force is a non-option, then the outcome becomes binary: (1) Spain accommodates and recognizes Catalan independence; (2) Spain does not accommodate and Catalonia becomes an unrecognized state.
The Assumption of Non-Violence
Abraham Lincoln famously stated that the Confederacy's declaration of independence had forced the country to choose between dissolution and blood. xliii He was probably not the first leader to frame the issue in that manner and he certainly wasn't the last. Secessionist demands are a frequent source of conflict in the world, implicated in roughly half the civil wars since 1945. xliv Nevertheless, we assume in our paper that the Spanish state will not use violence to deny Catalan independence, provided the secessionists deliberately and publicly choose non-violent methods in pursuit of their goal.
There are two reasons for our assumption of non-violence. The first centers on the logic of consequences. If a clear majority of Catalans vote for independence and the Catalan government proceeds in a legitimate and non-violent manner, the Spanish state will suffer costs once it decides to stop that secession with military force. At that point the Catalan secessionists would be more committed, and Madrid's use of force could easily create a violent backlash. Although the scale of the resulting turmoil is hard to predict, it is certain that the resort to violence would threaten the economies of Spain and, for the reasons already mentioned, the EU. Arguments relating financial interdependence to conflict are particularly salient here. xlv Even the increased probability of conflict in the northeast of Spain would frighten investors and exacerbate the existing bank crisis. Although we believe that this factor alone raises the cost of fighting above that of accommodation, we do not include this third option in our model for normative reasons that we now turn to.
The second and more important reason focuses on the logic of appropriateness. The use of violence by the state to deny independence to secessionists using peaceful methods is simply considered inappropriate in Spain and much of EU. The avoidance of war is after all one of the original purposes behind the EU. It is taken as an accepted wisdom among
Catalans and other Spaniards that the state would not resort to violence in the face of nonviolent and democratic tactics. We believe that illegitimacy of violence can be thought of as a social fact: 'facts that are produced by virtue of all the relevant actors agreeing that they exist.' xlvi If all of the relevant actors consider violence to be inappropriate, then it ceases to be option.
In making this argument we deliberately invoke the literature on norms. 
Conclusion
We have argued that the current financial situation in Spain and the EU provides Catalonia with an opportunity. If Catalonia attempts to secede after a pro-independence referendum or referendum, and does so in a legitimate and peaceful manner, Spain will be left with two choices: (1) To negotiate Catalan independence and accession to the E.U. if
Catalonia accepts a percentage of the national debt; (2) To deny formal recognition to Catalonia but risk Spanish insolvency and the economic viability of the Euro. We argue that the second option is far worse for all parties and, as a result, Spain will be forced to accommodate Catalan independence. To avoid this choice between the sword and the wall, Spain may be able offer a deal to Catalonia that effectively buys off a portion of the population and prevents a referendum from occurring. But Spain may not be able to afford such an offer in the current economic environment. The current economic woes of Spain contribute to the desire for Catalan independence and make it possible.
Rather than argue that this outcome will occur, or even that it should occur, we prefer to draw attention to the fact that it can occur. Catalonia represents a particular breed of secessionist movement, one that may well become more common in the future. Unlike the violent secessionist struggles in Myanmar or Yemen, secessionism in Catalonia has been negotiated in a remarkably peaceful and institutional manner. This seems to be the hallmark of secessionism in advanced democracies. Rather than resort to force, the state has to persuade the break-away region that their interests are better served by staying together. Of course, sovereign states do have other weapons at their disposal, and one of the most potent is their ability to block international recognition of the seceding region. xlviii But this is all part of the bargaining environment in which aspiring nations have to negotiate with their sovereign.
For Catalonia, the current economic crisis has created a situation in which the home state veto may be too costly for Madrid. Bosch et al 2010. There is a heated debate both about the criteria used to measure the inter-regional fiscal flows and whether the size of the flow is fair. xxviii Two famous Spanish economists, Angel de la Fuente and Germa Bel, had an interesting discussion in the press. Finally De la Fuente conceded he was not able to find any region with a higher fiscal deficit than Catalonia outside of Spain. He also pointed out that several states in the US would be similar to Catalonia, and that, in any case the fiscal deficit as a whole is more or less fair. See De la Fuente 2013. xxix With two important exceptions: the Basque Country and Navarra. Those two regions have an exceptional funding model based on medieval rights enshrined in the Spanish constitution. With a GDP per capita similar to Catalonia their fiscal imbalance counts for only 3% of the GDP. The population of the Basque Country and Navarra enjoy the best public services in Spain. xxx INE 2013. xxxi As a result of industrialization and consequent interior migrations a high proportion of Catalans (50%) have ancestors who spoke only Spanish. xxxii Catalan nationalism has a strong civic character. The above mentioned poll from CIS shows that 70% of Catalans believe that a Catalan is someone who has the will to be Catalan and 67% consider that a Catalan is someone that lives and works in Catalonia. xxxiii Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, 2013. xxxiv In fact, the April 2013 survey published by the CIS showed, that 'corruption and fraud' (39.3%) and 'politicians, political parties and politics' (29.4%) were, respectively, the second and fourth most important problems after 'unemployment' (80.7%) and 'economic problems' (35.5%). xxxv A referendum as contemplated in the Spanish constitution needs to be called by the Spanish government. This is unlikely to happen but Catalonia can run some form of referendum on its own. As we write the Catalan parliament is about to pass a law that would allow the Catalan regional government to call for a non-binding vote. xxxvi The vote in favor of independence needs to be strong enough (for instance >55% in favor with no more than 30% against) for the Catalan government to proceed. xxxvii We expect that both players will try to influence p using any available tools of political propaganda. Using those tools is a dominant strategy and therefore does not need to be modeled. 
